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Since the late 1970's the United States has progressively deregulated the motor carrier industry. 
Throughout the 1980's, deregulation was viewed as a positive trend by most industry practitioners. 
Past research has determined that, despite the fact that bankruptcies have increased since 
deregulation, the motor carrier industry has benefitted by less government intervention. The 
current study attempts to ascertain if motor carrier deregulation is still perceived positively in the 
mid-1990's. This research uses an event study methodology to examine the immediate financial 
impact of the ICC Termination Act of 1995 on 44 motor carrier industry participants. The results 
indicate deregulation is still perceived positively by shareholders as illustrated by the average 
publicly traded motor carrier benefittingby between $1.25 million and $6.1 million duringthe period 
surrounding termination of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In all likelihood, shareholders 
of companies in this industry benefitted due to the perception that industry deregulation leads to 
the ability to expand and pursue business opportunities previously restricted while operatingunder 
a more regulated regime.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to termination of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, one of the primary responsibilities 
of the ICC was to observe surface 
transportation providers and monitor their
compliance with economic regulations. 
Primarily due to dramatic deregulation of U.S. 
surface transportation over the last twenty 
years, U.S. lawmakers determined the ICC was 
no longer necessary. As a result, the Interstate
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Commerce Commission (ICC) was terminated 
effective January 1, 1996.
Considerable speculation exists in the 
transportation industry about the economic 
and/or strategic impacts associated with a 
public policy change like termination of the ICC. 
Past research into market structure has 
examined the impact of a public policy change 
on the strategies pursued by members of the 
transportation industry (Smith & Grimm 1987, 
Corsi & Grimm 1989). However the authors 
were unable to identify previous transportation 
research specifically examining the immediate 
financial impact created by a public policy 
change. Therefore the current research focuses 
on examiningthe immediate financial response 
experienced by publicly traded motor carriers 
when news of termination of the ICC was 
publicized.
BACKGROUND
Since the late 1970’s a major trend in the United 
States has been to reduce or eliminate 
economic regulation in the transportation 
industry. Duringthis era industry practitioners 
successfully argued that motor carrier 
regulation made entrance into the motor carrier 
industry extremely difficult and dramatically 
reduced or completely eliminated price 
competition and service enhancement (Chow 
1980). As a result the ICC began to reduce 
enforcement of regulatory policies in the late 
1970's (Pickett & Kletke 1984, Pustay 1985). In 
1980 Congress responded to pressure to 
deregulate this mode of surface transportation 
by passing the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. The 
act dramatically reformed the regulatory 
structure of the motor carrier industry and 
began the process of restoring the industry to a 
free market.
Since passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 
the trend towards further deregulation of the
motor carrier industry has continued. 
Subsequent acts have facilitated the process of 
deregulation by abolishing additional 
regulations. The ICC Termination Act of 1995 
was seen by many in the motor carrier industry 
as a continuation of the trend to reduce 
government intervention into private 
enterprise.
As recently as the mid-1990's industry 
participants have successfully argued that the 
federal government needs to continue the trend 
of deregulation. They argue that eliminating 
some existing regulations is necessary if the 
motor carrier industry is to operate in a totally 
free market environment. The ICC Termination 
Act of 1995 addressed several of the regulatory 
concerns of industry lobbyists by reducing or 
eliininatingregulations perceived by many to be 
restrictive. A few key areas addressed in the 
1995 ICC Termination Act include: elimination 
of restrictions on cont ract carriers, reduction in 
tariff filingrequirements, and further reduction 
in rate regulation.
STUDY
Past research indicates that the net impact of 
motor carrier deregulation from 1980 to 1990 
was positive (Winston, Corsi, Grimm & Evans, 
1990). However, past research also indicates 
motor carrier deregulation has been a 
troublesome event for many as evidenced by the 
significant number of bankruptcies occurring in 
the years since industry deregulation began 
(Corsi, Grimm, Smith, & Smith 1991, Harper & 
Johnson 1987, LaLonde 1984-1985). Therefore, 
the current research attempts to determine if 
the trend toward motor carrier deregulation is 
still perceived positively in the mid-1990's. To 
accomplish this the researchers look at one 
specific public policy change (termination of the 
ICC) perceived by most industry observers and 
participants to be a move towards further 
deregulation. If this act of deregulation was
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viewed favorably (unfavorably) by the motor 
carrier industry, then one should find that the 
stock prices of motor carriers increased 
(decreased) when it was announced that the 
ICC would be terminated. Focusing' on the 
stock price reaction to the announcement of the 
ICC Termination Act will not only permit one to 
determine the response of the industry to 
deregulation, but it will also provide 
information on the financial benefits of 
deregulation.
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
Compared to previous studies examining the 
net impact of motor carrier deregulation, the 
methodology for this study is somewhat unique. 
Previous transportation studies have 
traditionally focused on the long-term financial 
performance of motor carriers subsequent to 
deregulation. YYliile the traditional approach 
can provide researchers with valuable insight, 
there is no certainty the net change in financial 
performance is solely attributable to 
deregulation.
The purpose of the event study methodology is 
to determine whether motor carriers benefitted 
financially from the ICC Termination Act of 
1995. More specifically, we examine stock price 
changes to determine the stock markets’ 
response to the announcement that President 
Clinton signed the ICC Termination Act into 
law.1 Concentratingon the stock price reaction 
to this announcement will not only allow us to 
determine the financial markets’ immediate 
response to the ICC Termination Act, but it also 
allows us to examine the strategic implications 
for managers in the motor carrier industry. It 
is clear from previous research (Chow 1980) 
that it is costly for motor carriers to comply 
with governmental regulations. Previous 
research (Winston, Corsi, Grimm & Evans, 
1990) has also shown that deregulation benefits 
motor carriers because it reduces the costly
burdens of governmental regulation. Our 
primary goal is to determine if there is an 
immediate and significant stock price reaction 
to passage of the ICC Termination Act and to 
examine the financial impact on industry 
participants.
We form a sample of motor carriers using the 
1996 CRSP2 database that includes firms that 
trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the 
Nasdaq stock market. To be included in the 
sample, the firm’s primary SIC code must be 
4210 (trucking courier), 4213 (trucking, except 
local), or 4215 (courier services, except by air). 
Each motor carrier must also be publicly traded 
and have daily returns over an eleven-day event 
period. Furthermore, the motor carrier must 
not have had any major news announcement 
during the eleven-day event period.3
For each firm we search the Wall Street 
Journal Index for major news announcements 
to determine whether or not we have a clean 
event period. If there is another major 
announcement concerning a firm during this 
time period, then we do not have a clean event 
period and cannot determine the impact of the 
ICC Termination Act on that firm. If a clean 
event period can not be determined for a firm, 
it is eliminated from the sample. For example, 
assume a motor carrier firm received a large 
federal government contract on the same day it 
was announced that President Clinton signed 
the ICC Termination Act. If the firm's stock 
price increased drastically, the event study 
methodology cannot determine whether the 
increase was a result of the government 
contract or the ICC Termination Act. However, 
if there are no other major announcements 
during our event period, then our event study 
methodology can examine that portion of the 
stock’s return that can be attributed to the ICC 
Termination Act and that portion attributable 
to the overall market.
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE OF MOTOR CARRIERS, THEIR TICKER SYMBOLS, THE STOCK MARKET ON 
WHICH THE STOCK IS PUBLICLY TRADED, AND THE SIC CODES
Number --------------------------- Name Ticker Market SIC Code
1 3 C I Complete Compliance Corp TCCC Nasdaq 4210
2 Aasche Transportation Svcs Inc ASHE Nasdaq 4210
3 Allied Holdings Inc HAUL Nasdaq 4210
4 American Freightways Corp AFWY Nasdaq 4210
5 Ampace Corp PACE Nasdaq 4210
6 AnuhcoInc ANU AMEX 4213
7 Arkansas Best Corp Del ABES Nasdaq 4210
8 Arnold Industries Inc AIND Nasdaq 4210
9 Arrow Transportation Co ARRW Nasdaq 4210
10 Boyd Bros Transportation Inc BOYD Nasdaq 4210
11 Builders Transport Inc TRUK Nasdaq 4213
12 Cannon Express Inc CANXA Nasdaq 4210
13 Celadon Group Inc CLDN Nasdaq 4210
14 Consolidated Freightways Inc CNF NYSE 4213
15 Countrywide Transport Svcs In CWTS Nasdaq 4210
16 Covenant Transport Inc C VTI Nasdaq 4210
17 F R P Properties Inc FRPP Nasdaq 4210
18 Frozen Food Express Inds Inc FFEX Nasdaq 4210
19 General Parcel Service Inc GPSX Nasdaq 4210
20 Heartland Express Inc HTLD Nasdaq 4210
21 Hunt J B Transport Services In JBHT Nasdaq 4213
22 Intrenet Inc INET Nasdaq 4210
23 KLLMTransport Svcs Inc KLLM Nasdaq 4210
24 Kenan Transport Co KTCO Nasdaq 4210
25 Knight Transportation Inc KNGT Nasdaq 4210
26 Landair Services Inc LAND Nasdaq 4210
27 Landstar System Inc LSTR Nasdaq 4210
28 M S Carriers Inc MSCA Nasdaq 4210
29 Mark VII Inc MVII Nasdaq 4210
30 Marten Transport Ltd MRTN Nasdaq 4210
31 Matlack Systems Inc MLK NYSE 4213
32 MTL Inc MTLI Nasdaq 4210
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Table 1 
(continued)
Number Name Ticker Market SIC Code
33 0 T R Express Inc OTRX Nasdaq 4210
34 Old Dominion Freight Line Inc ODFL Nasdaq 4210
35 PAM Transportation Svcs Inc PTSI Nasdaq 4210
36 Simon Transportation Svcs Inc SIMN Nasdaq 4210
37 Swift Transportation Co Inc SWFT Nasdaq 4210
38 Trism Inc TRSM Nasdaq 4210
39 U S 1 Industries Inc USO NYSE 4215
40 USA Truck Inc USAK Nasdaq 4210
41 U S Environmental Solutions In USES Nasdaq 4210
42 U S Xpress Enterprises Inc XPRSA Nasdaq 4210
43 Werner Enterprises Inc WERN Nasdaq 4210
11 Yellow Coro YELL Nasdaa 4213
In addition, we also check for any industry 
announcement during this period that would 
contaminate the stock returns for all companies 
in the industry. No industry announcements 
were found during the eleven day period. Since 
no firm specific or industry wide 
announcements were made during the eleven 
days under study, our event study methodology 
can determine if there is an abnormal change in 
stock price that can be attributed to 
termination of the ICC.
Our sample includes 44 motor carriers that are 
listed in Table l.4 Our sample includes three 
motor carriers that trade on the NYSE 
(Consolidated Freightways, US 1 Industries 
Inc., and Matlack Systems Inc.) and one motor 
carrier that trades oil the AMEX (Anuhco Inc.). 
The other forty motor carriers trade on the 
Nasdaq stock market and include firms like J.B. 
Hunt, Werner Enterprises, Arnold Industries, 
Swift Transportation, Heartland Express, and 
Yellow Corporation. The mean capitalization 
value for the sample of motor carriers is $151
million and the standard deviation is $221 
million.5 The median capitalization for the 
sample is $66 million and the capitalization 
values range from $3.3 million for Country Wide 
Transport to $1.1 billion for Consolidated 
Freightways.
An event study methodology is used to examine 
the reaction of motor carriers’ stock prices to 
the passage of the ICC Termination Act of 1995. 
The event study methodology is well established 
and commonly used to analyze the impact of an 
event on stock prices. The event study breaks 
the stock price change into two components. 
The first component is the stock price change 
that is a result of a general stock market price 
change. The second component is the stock 
price change that is a result of an informational 
event. In the current study the ICC Termination 
Act serves as the informational event. The first 
step of an event study is to define an event 
period that is usually centered on the 
announcement date which is called day zero 
(t = 0). The announcement date in this study is
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December 29, 1995, the date that The Wall 
Street Journal reported that President Clinton 
signed the ICC Termination Act into law.6 
Since the event period should capture all the 
event’s effects on stock prices, an eleven-day 
event period is often used. Day minus one, (t=- 
1), is defined as one trading day prior to the 
announcement, day plus one, (t = l), is one 
trading day after the announcement, and so 
forth. Thus, day minus five, (t=-5), is defined 
as five trading days prior to the announcement 
and day plus five, (t = 5), is defined as five 
trading days after the announcement.
The next step of an event study is to calculate 
the predicted (or normal) return for each day in 
the event period for each firm. The predicted 
return is the return that would be expected if no 
event took place. Since the return on the 
market index is commonly used as the 
predicted return, we use the return on the S&P 
500 Index as the predicted return.
The S&P 500 is a market index of 500 large 
domestic corporations whose market 
capitalization represent around 75% of all 
publicly traded corporations in the United 
States. Hence, the S&P 500 return is an 
excellent proxy for the market return. Then we 
calculate the daily excess return for each stock 
for each day over the eleven-day event period. 
An excess return represents that portion of a 
predicted return that is not due to overall 
market fluctuations, but is a result of the 
unique characteristics of the individual firm. 
The daily excess returns for each individual 
motor carrier i on day t, ERit, is defined as:
ERit = R„- Rmt (1)
where Rjt is the return on the stock of motor 
carrier i on day t and Rmt is the return on the 
market portfolio (S&P 500 Index) on day t. The 
daily excess return represents the return that 
is not predicted by the overall market and is an
estimate of the change in the stock price on that 
day. By summing together the daily excess 
returns of the 44 motor carriers each day we 
can calculate the average excess return. The 
average excess return allows the creation of 
what can be viewed as a diversified portfolio 
with firms only within a specific industry. This 
diversified portfolio-like technique eliminates 
the unique individual firm returns by offsetting 
random positive stock return movements with 
random negative stock price movements. The 
result is an average excess return that captures 
only the unique characteristics of the ICC event 
under examination in this paper. The average 
excess return for each day of the event period 
is calculated as:
AER, = E ER„]/N (2)
i= 1
where N is equal to 44, the number of motor 
carriers in our sample, and ERit is the daily 
excess return for motor carrier i on day t. Any 
non-event or insignificant event should result in 
an AER, that is not significantly different from 
zero. Statistical tests of significance are based 
on the Z statistic defined as:
 (3)
where 6, is the standard deviation of the daily 
excess returns on day t and N, is equal to 44, 
the number of motor carriers in our sample, 
and AER, is the average excess return for day 
t of the event period.
It is also important to examine the cumulative 
average excess return, CAER, because 
information is often leaked to the financial 
market just prior to the event’s announcement 
and the market often takes several days to 
completely digest the financial impact of an 
event upon a firm’s future financial 
performance as captured by the stock price.
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The cumulative average excess return, CAER. , t, 
is defined as:
 (4)
where CAER.lt is determined for a defined 
interval from day minus one to some day such as 
day zero (CAER_10) or day plus five (CAER., +5). 
The CAERl t is an estimate of the change in 
stock price that is caused by the event over a 
period of time. The market participants may 
quickly begin figuring into the stock price the 
effect of an anticipated, though unannounced, 
event. This typically happens the day before the 
announcement and the amount of change in the 
stock price is based on the perceived probability 
of the event occurring. The market will continue 
to make adjustments over several days following 
the announcement as analysts and market 
participants attempt to determine the magnitude 
of the event on each firm. For example, an 
announcement that one firm in an industry has 
much higher earnings than expected will drive 
up that company’s stock price, but the full 
adjustment may take from hours to days for the 
market to digest. The smaller the firm the more 
likely it will take longer for the market to 
completely adjust and completely reflect the 
updated news about earnings.
The NASDAQ market is generally considered to 
trade smaller capitalized stocks whose prices 
would take slightly longer to adjust to an event. 
Since our sample has 40 of 44 firms that trade 
on the Nasdaq market, we expect that it may 
take several days for the market to completely 
price the event (termination of the ICC). For 
robustness and completeness, we examine the 
C.AER_lt over several different intervals. Again, 
any non-event period or an insignificant event 
period should result in a CAER_lt that is not 
significantly different from zero. Statistical 
tests of significance are based on the Z statistic 
defined as:
 (5)
where 6t is the standard deviation the average 
excess returns over the interval, and Nt is 
equal to 44, the number of motor carriers in our 
sample, and CAER., t is the cumulative average 
excess return over the interval.
RESULTS
We examine the AERs of the entire sample for 
each of the eleven days and the CAERs over six 
time intervals. Table 2 presents the AERs for 
each day of the eleven-day event period. The 
.AERs range from a low of -1.2% on day minus 
two to a high of 1.7% on day minus one. As 
expected, most days have positive .AERs (days 
-3, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) and two of the seven days 
have significantly positive average excess 
returns (AER_, at 1.7% and AERn at 1.0%).
The major tests in this methodology involve 
testing'the CAERs over time intervals that allow 
the financial markets to decipher the effect of 
the passage of the ICC Termination Act on 
motor carriers. Thus, we examine the 
cumulative average excess return, CAER.lt, 
over six time intervals that are presented in 
Table 3. If the ICC Termination Act of 1995 is 
perceived as favorable by the stock market, 
then the CAERs should be significantly positive. 
Conversely, if the Act is perceived as 
unfavorable, then the CAER, should be 
significantly negative. The CAER for each time 
interval is positive (with CAER., 0 the lowest at 
1.9% and CAER14 the highest at 4.1%). 
Additionally, every C.AER is highly significant 
(with Z-statistics from 1.527 to 2.779). Thus, on 
average, motor carriers saw their stockholders’ 
wealth increase somewhere between two and 
four percent when President Clinton signed the 
ICC Termination Act of 1995.
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The next part of our analysis is to measure the 
dollar effect on motor carriers and these results 
are presented in Table 4. If we multiply the 
smallest cumulative average excess return, 
CAER 10 by the mean (median) capitalization 
value for the sample, we find that the average 
motor carrier gained over $2.87 million ($1.25 
million) by President Clinton signing the bill. 
Conservatively, motor carriers gained between 
$1.25 million and $2.87 million when Clinton 
signed the ICC Termination Act. Applying the 
same method to the highest cumulative average 
excess return, CAER 14 we find that the average 
motor carrier gained over $6.1 million ($3.9
million). Thus, in the best case scenario, motor 
carriers may have gained between $3.9 million 
and $6.1 million with the passage of the ICC 
Termination Act. In addition to statistical 
significance, it is clear that the results are 
economically meaningful. Shareholders in the 
motor carrier industry economically benefitted 
dramatically from the passage of the ICC 
Termination Act. In fact, over the two- to 
seven-day event period window around which 
the bill was signed, the owners of these forty- 
four motor carriers cumulatively gained 
somewhere between $55 million and $272 
million.
TABLE 2













1 The Z-statistic is a test of the null hypothesis that the AER, is significantly greater than zero. 
***, **, * Denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 3
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE EXCESS RETURNS (CAER., t)
Interval CAER,, Z-Statistic1
(-1,5) 3.826% 2.482***





1 The Z-statistic is a test of the null hypothesis that the CAER.,, is significantly greater than zero.
***, **, * Denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 4
FINANCIAL GAINS TO OWNER S OF MOTOR CARRIERS FROM THE PASSAGE OF THE 
ICC TERMINATION ACT OF 1995 (DOLLAR FIGURES IN MILLIONS)
Interval CAER, t Average Motor Carrier Gain in Wealth Cumulative Wealth Gain for Industry
using the Mean (Median) Cap Value1 using Mean (Median) Cap Value"
(-1,5) 3.826% $5,788 $254.7
($2,528) ($111.2)
(-1,4) 4.078% $6,169 $271.5
($2,694) ($118.5)
(-1,3) 3.689% $5,581 $245.6
($2,437) ($107.2)
(-1,2) 2.652% $4,012 $176.5
($1,752) ($77.1)
(-U) 2.079% $3,145 $138.4
($1,374) ($60.4)
(-1,0) 1.901% $2,876 $126.5
($1,256) ($55.3)
1 The average motor carrier gain in wealth using the mean cap value is calculated by multiplying the cumulative 
average excess return (CAER.,,) by $151 million ($60 million) which is the mean (median) cap value of the firms 
in our sample.
The cumulative wealth gain for industry using the mean (median) cap value is calculated by multiplying the 44 
firms in the sample by the average motor carrier gain using the mean (median) cap value.
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MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
"The essence of any applied discipline is to 
accumulate sufficient knowledge to guide 
practitioners toward successful achievement of 
their responsibilities" (World Class Logistics 
1995). The current research attempts to assist 
practitioners in accumulating knowledge about 
the importance of a public policy change on 
their industry. Since government regulation is 
costly to motor carriers and deregulation is 
welcomed by the financial markets, these 
results have several implications for managers 
in the transportation industry.
The results of the current research illustrate 
that the shareholders of the average motor 
carrier gained between $1.25 million and $6.1 
million with the passage of the ICC Termination 
Act. The positive stock price reaction to 
deregulation should clearly justify to 
transportation executives that they should 
consider providing significant resources to 
trade associations designed to pursue a free 
market agenda for the motor carrier industry. 
Motor carrier executives should also consider 
participating in an active coalition that meets 
annually with key Representatives and 
Senators in Washington.
Since the motor carrier industry as a whole 
recognizes significant gains from deregulation, 
the industry needs to participate in a coalition 
designed to work toward a common goal. 
Establishing a long-term coalition with other 
executives in the motor carrier industry could 
dramatically improve the industry’s 
Congressional lobbying power in Washington. 
Effectively constructed coalitions can provide 
carriers with a long-term relationship where all 
the coalition members can benefit from the 
strong pursuit of further industry deregulation. 
The popularity of implementing coalition type 
relationships with other businesses appears to 
be rising as firms realize the high level of
achievement available by pooling resources 
with other companies and employing 
networking techniques.
Building coalitions and pooling resources with 
other carriers not only provides companies with 
a better resource base but also allows 
individual carriers to concentrate on specific 
lobbying efforts where they have developed an 
expertise. Properly designed, an effective 
coalition provides the industry with a powerful 
cohesive entity while at the same time allowing 
each participant of the coalition to utilize 
individual strengths to pursue specific goals. 
However, for the coalition to w ork effectively all 
of the members must feel each participant is 
willing to dedicate resources to the common 
efforts of the coalition.
Competition levels in the motor carrier industry 
have increased dramatically since deregulation 
(Harper 1982 & 1983). As the U.S. continues to 
pursue a strategy of industry deregulation it is 
likely that downward pressure will continue to 
be placed on prices. Downward pressure on 
prices often reduces profit margins and 
increases the importance of each carrier 
understanding their individual operating costs. 
In response to the changing operating 
environment management must have a strategy 
in place to continually track and monitor costs. 
Effective implementation of such a strategy 
allows managers to more accurately determine 
the costs associated with each movement and 
adjust the price when necessary.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the study only measures the financial 
gain to motor carriers by the passage of the ICC 
Termination Act of 1995, it should be pointed 
out that deregulation also produces financial 
gains for other stakeholders, including 
taxpayers, shippers, and consumers. 
Taxpayers who do not have to pay the cost of
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operating unnecessary government agencies 
(e.g., ICC) realize a financial benefit since they 
are no longer required to fund the agency 
through Federal tax dollars. Customers (e.g., 
shippers and consumers) also benefit 
financially since deregulation tends to increase 
motor carrier service levels and decrease costs. 
The result is a better overall value for the many 
customers of the motor carrier industry.
Current participants in the motor carrier 
industry appear fully aware they may continue 
to face big adjustments in order to remain 
competitive in the aggressive environment 
created by further deregulation (Corsi, Grimm,
Smith, & Smith 1991). Nevertheless, it appears 
the trend towards industry deregulation is 
perceived positively by owners and 
stakeholders throughout the motor carrier 
industry. The results of our investigation 
indicate a strong positive reaction to 
deregulation. The forty-four publicly traded 
carriers in the current study gained an 
astonishing $55 million to $272 million over the 
period surrounding termination of the ICC. 
Therefore, the researchers conclude a strategy 
of continued deregulation is good for the motor 
carrier industry and should be pursued 
vigorously.
ENDNOTES
1 There are two characteristics of stocks that allow one to examine the impact of an event 
on an industry or firm. First, stock prices are determined by a firm’s expected future earnings. 
Second, stock prices react quickly and efficiently to news that will impact expected future earnings 
of the firm. Therefore the announcement of an event that is perceived by investors as favorable 
(unfavorable), to increase (decrease) future earnings, will result in an immediate stock price 
increase (decrease). Thus, examination of a firm’s stock price reaction to an event via an event 
study methodology provides a venue by which managers can immediately gauge the expected 
economic impact on an industry or a firm.
2 CRSP stands for the Center for Research in Security Prices and is located at the 
Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago. The daily stock returns and the S&P 500 
Index returns used in this study were also taken from the 1996 CRSP database.
Since the event window spans two years (December 21,1995 through January 8,1996), we 
searched the Wall Street Journal Index for 1995 and 1996 for major news announcements during 
the eleven-day event period.
4 There are initially 45 firms with primary SIC codes of 4210, 4213, and 4215. Thus, only 
Rollins Truck Leasing Corp. was deleted from the sample because it is primarily an equipment 
leasing company.
The capitalization value of a company represents the market value of its owners’ equity. 
The capitalization value is calculated by multiplying the motor carrier’s stock price by its number 
of shares outstanding. Our event study methodology measures the gain or loss to the capitalization 
value of motor carriers that can be attributed to the event examined.
The order of events leading up to the passage of the ICC Termination Act of 1995 is as 
follows. The House of Representatives passed their version of the bill in June 1995 and the Senate
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passed their version in November 1995. Although the House and Senate both passed versions of 
the bill, President Clinton opposed the ICC Termination Act and according to the December 21,1995 
Wall Street Journal, Clinton threatened to veto the bill. This means that there was a clear signal 
sent to the financial markets that passage of the Act was unlikely. However, over the next week 
Clinton changed his position and signed the bill into law.
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FIGURE 1: AERs and CAERs
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